Re: [Idr] [[e-mail]: I-D Action: draft-haas-idr-extended-experimental-00.txt]

[Jeffrey Haas <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Nov 01, 2016 at 06:04:14PM +0100, Peter Hessler wrote:
> if adopted by the WG, I'd be interested in tightening it up a bit more
> but that can be handled then.

On Tue, Nov 01, 2016 at 01:10:59PM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote:
> I’m for adopting this draft as well.
> 
> I would like to clean up the security text, as there is a lot of history behind the section 6 text:

Feel free to suggest patches:

https://github.com/jhaas-pfrc/extended-experimental


> 6.  Security Considerations
> 
>    This document does not introduce any new security considerations into
>    the BGP-4 protocol.  While the injection of unknown or badly
>    formatted Optional-Transitive Path Attributes has been and remains an
>    issue impacting the stability of the Internet, this proposal doesn't
>    increase exposure to that issue.  It is rather expected that this
>    proposal helps remediate the accidental attack surface that
>    incremental BGP protocol work exposes to the Internet at large.
>  - snip -
> 
> I believe it should acknowledge that in the pre-7606 world the handling
> was as defined but subsequently considered harmful and with 7606 covers
> the risks from this document.  Simply put, striking the text after the first
> paragraph and saying the handling in 7606 covers the risk SHOULD be
> sufficient.

Time constraints aside, I thought a bit about this as I was scribbling up a
quick security section.  I think it might make sense to do some level of
brief overview of the issues RFC 7606 addressed in prior sections as part of
the motivation of why we need a bit better sandboxing of early work.
Section 1 covers this to some extent.  However, I'm not sure it belongs in
the considerations for this document.

-- Jeff