Re: [Idr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-idr-shutdown-08.txt> (BGP Administrative Shutdown Communication) to Proposed Standard

Hi Job,

Assuming that by "visual spoofing" you really mean this:
http://websec.github.io/unicode-security-guide/visual-spoofing/ how does
limiting the length of the field helps to minimize it ?

It is UTF which is a problem here regardless of the length.

Ok so we leave 129-255 for further use .. brilliant. Assume someone comes
tomorrow and has a great use case for sending one byte of information in
the cease. So he defines length 129 right ? And even if operator did not
type anything for the "shutdown case" ... first 128 bytes goes empty, then
goes one newly defined octet. Is this really how protocol encoding should
be done in 2017 ? Is concept of TLV so complex ?

Cheers,
R.

On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 9:46 PM, Job Snijders <job@ntt.net> wrote:

>
> On Mon, 8 May 2017 at 21:36, Enke Chen <enkechen@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>> I understand this is not a good use of time.  But since it is in the
>> spec, I would like to understand the reasons.  If there are good reasons
>> for doing things differently, then they should be documented in the spec
>> so that people do not question again.
>
>
>
> In the security section: "This specification minimizes the effects of
> visual spoofing by limiting the length of the Shutdown Communication."
>
> On 5/8/17 12:13 PM, Jakob Heitz (jheitz) wrote:
>> > It is deliberately kept short to minimize the potential for abuse.
>>
>> 128 is ok, and 129- 255 would be considered abuse?
>
>
> Those are an error according to the draft.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Job
>
>
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