Re: [Idr] recap my questions and issues raised during IDR Thurs session for draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-12

[Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]>]

John,

You raised a good point.

In RFC5512, the BGP speaker indicates the originating Interface address in the NLRI. I would imagine the receiver can validate the information.

the draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-12 doesn’t have the information, is it correct?

Linda

From: John Scudder <[e-mail]>
Sent: Monday, June 10, 2019 5:17 PM
To: Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]>
Cc: Keyur Patel <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: recap my questions and issues raised during IDR Thurs session for draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-12

(As a WG contributor)

Hi Linda,

I have a question for you — when you say RFC5512 doesn’t allow a third party to inject routes on behalf of a legitimate router, what do you think would prevent it? You mention the endpoint address in the NLRI, but what would prevent the malicious entity you mention for falsifying it?

Thanks,

—John


On Jun 10, 2019, at 4:47 PM, Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

Keyur,

Thank for the email.
One more question:

  *   Does the “Remote Endpoint” in draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-12 represent the BGP speaker that originates the update? Or the remote end point that the “Tunnel” is established to?

     *   I have been told two different versions of the answers. I need confirmation from the authors.


Reading through the Section 13 Security Consideration, I don’t think the following questions have been addressed:


  1.  In RFC5512, the BGP speaker indicates the originating Interface address in the NLRI (section 3):

<image001.png>

Questions:


  *   draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-12  no longer has the BGP speaker originating the update. Is it intended?


If Yes, does it mean that it allows a third party (which could be malicious entity) to inject routes on behalf of a legitimate router (but RFC5512 doesn’t)?


  *   Why add this scenario? If it is a conscious decision, should have some text to explain why and how to mitigate the security threats introduced.


  *   Section 13 suggests using BGP Origin Validation to obtain the additional assurances of the origin AS is valid. But being valid origin AS doesn’t mean the specific flow is supposed to go/come from there.


#Keyur: Section 13 of the draft version 12 describes Security Considerations that should address your security questions. The option is to provide flexibility.


Thank you,

Linda Dunbar

From: Keyur Patel <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Sent: Saturday, June 08, 2019 3:45 AM
To: Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Cc: John Scudder <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: recap my questions and issues raised during IDR Thurs session for draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-11

Hi Linda,

Apologies for the delayed response. Responses are inline. #Keyur

From: Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Thursday, March 28, 2019 at 6:52 AM
To: idr wg <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: recap my questions and issues raised during IDR Thurs session for draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-11
Resent-From: <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Resent-To: <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Resent-Date: Thursday, March 28, 2019 at 6:52 AM

Just want to reiterate my questions and issues I raised during IDR Thurs session for draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-11, to make it easier for the authors to address them in the next revision (I have sent the questions multiple times on the IDR mailing list, but no one responded):


  1.  When a client route can egress multiple egress ports (each with different IP addresses), does the Tunnel-Encap allow multiple “Remote-endpoint” SubTLV to be attached one UPDATE?

#Keyur: Yes. Section 5 of the draft version 12 has a following  text:

<snip>
A Tunnel Encapsulation attribute may contain several TLVs that all
   specify the same tunnel type.  Each TLV should be considered as
   specifying a different tunnel.  Two tunnels of the same type may have
   different Remote Endpoint sub-TLVs, different Encapsulation sub-TLVs,
   etc.  Choosing between two such tunnels is a matter of local policy.
</snip>



  1.  Section 3.1 Page 10: The last paragraph states that if “Remote-Endpoint sub-TLV contains address is valid but not reachable, and the containing TLV is NOT be malformed ..”. Why a address not reachable is considered as “Not Malformed”?

#Keyur: That is because the Remote-Endpoint could become reachable at the later time. Making it malformed would mean that the Remote-Endpoint has to be dropped upon a receipt of the update message (and could never be used).



  1.  In RFC5512, the BGP speaker indicates the originating Interface address in the NLRI (section 3):

<image001.png>

draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-11  no longer has the BGP speaker originating the update. Is it intended? If Yes, does it mean that it allows a third party (which could be malicious entity) to inject routes on behalf of a legitimate router (but RFC5512 doesn’t)?  Why add this scenario? How to address the security threats introduced? If it is a conscious decision, should have some text to explain why and how to mitigate the security threats introduced.

#Keyur: Section 13 of the draft version 12 describes Security Considerations that should address your security questions. The option is to provide flexibility.

Regards,
Keyur



Thanks, Linda Dunbar