Re: [Idr] Securing BGP sessions (Issue#41)

Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanandani@gmail.com> Wed, 11 December 2019 01:40 UTC

Return-Path: <mjethanandani@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: idr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: idr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABC9212008C for <idr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:51 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.998
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XV6DuBzzD-qs for <idr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-pj1-x1030.google.com (mail-pj1-x1030.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1030]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4C28120059 for <idr@ietf.org>; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-pj1-x1030.google.com with SMTP id z21so8217369pjq.13 for <idr@ietf.org>; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:49 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=nGRP4R9dsxThxPXMieVexO9V4KBZyxyZEL3MfrOXxCs=; b=ldMk0JGF1yRSqnPDXZGOzN4cAbIPKJh/LaaInBtQkiZDChq4+gLRA3G08MElAFHQ5M aG8UYP5IC2wZgj08DWTKTmcV0HJ6sTNaeO3uLasdohh4BlR8FWpMY/ig6DOVymI9NNYX BaK8WB5EppNs4PqkbWZmcruBcvqboaeQAlgaz+DBh7+d+uxp1edqcNGcGLDUKbb1D0VA 9vt+gcE7IZiZfiyEA4PbEgajKz+l540I5QSTZOOidhynPOCW0RyGMHF5mA1hdx/G11bA D3C/N+ucHqv1xLDrEZWrTr5LPXKXRMbyQqQQ6hSyW/DTVo8tcZ/vUsOMcqopiYuWSk1q 7h4A==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=nGRP4R9dsxThxPXMieVexO9V4KBZyxyZEL3MfrOXxCs=; b=ilVWW69Dq3DowQy2qw/DY4s/Xle64WJN5tJ2a+MorrHbeZpb+porjoYcFjsiri6Iit vWMfnugBX/x/4WI/euz2CN/IPCANq337SFNd98+aK5+gJv8AnWt2xFH5KTOpBf39VSy1 G3H7rpN0c3Ua4zNmRNpXwmNuaL4JAg6HbL1upbW1+3PQsjbUA96H1rIUjIabqQ1APDWZ wrEvdTYLzrv7tIWvn3TjxhZKpKYD6MSxJRmeAZKOxUD3VQvIvBKETTEIcPwCUIvKXfF5 x+Yq510zO4/KoDM5aBWs/atqEqj51sTXAanHman1ueQ4KI7cG3V2AL1AmUWSauPlc+q5 rjBg==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXdmsj4hORAXv9K2Ohu5b6+xXWXmFBS+xHzVaI9EzCdT0JSMARh eLW3Kh46znrvW5zGd1uwKJgLeMHs
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxoEcFESt4z8xyj6qXsnsdz7SGILptTkxMlV+wSEduQ/ylFsObcUpk/d/JnncttAzoCK0t4AQ==
X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:aa4c:: with SMTP id c12mr532121plr.178.1576028449307; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [10.33.123.64] ([66.170.99.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d24sm314090pfq.75.2019.12.10.17.40.48 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:48 -0800 (PST)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.5 \(3445.9.1\))
From: Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanandani@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <A8395DB8-6D10-46A1-99A1-DFFB9B2CBD9D@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:40:47 -0800
Cc: "idr@ietf.org" <idr@ietf.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <E126FB83-AB0B-46C6-91F0-396C9C4FBE9E@gmail.com>
References: <D9C310C0-89C6-4CB5-80A2-98C274581E7F@gmail.com> <68B00DBF-3590-4ECE-8028-301643B9E49E@cisco.com> <91B63CF9-B92B-4D14-98CA-EBC865999B08@gmail.com> <A8395DB8-6D10-46A1-99A1-DFFB9B2CBD9D@cisco.com>
To: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.9.1)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/idr/V5DLulHhblDfXzg1nVXfi5NH1mE>
Subject: Re: [Idr] Securing BGP sessions (Issue#41)
X-BeenThere: idr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Inter-Domain Routing <idr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/idr>, <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/idr/>
List-Post: <mailto:idr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr>, <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 01:40:52 -0000


> On Dec 10, 2019, at 5:29 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mahesh, 
> 
> On 12/10/19, 8:19 PM, "Mahesh Jethanandani" <mjethanandani@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>    Hi Acee,
> 
>> On Dec 10, 2019, at 5:10 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Mahesh, 
>> I assume by IPsec, you mean transport mode IPsec.
> 
>    Yes. The assumption is that the underlying transport is secured using IPsec, and the model provides (if needed) key parameters needed to kick off the IKE to setup the SA in IPsec.
> 
>    HTH.
> 
> Well it doesn't help at all.... Normally, the usage of IPsec (AH, ESP, algorithms, key exchange, etc.) would be specified in some document. For example, IPsec usage by OSPFv3 is specified in RFC 4552. Granted, it is a lot simpler for BGP than OSPFv3 since BGP is strictly P2P but specification would still seem to necessary. 

You are right. It should be some document. That document in my mind is the YANG model for IPsec/IKE, something we need to ask the SEC ADs about. You would agree that what needs to be defined is not BGP specific, and therefore does not belong in the BGP model.

Much like TCP-AO and TCP-MD5 I expect this other document to define a grouping that the BGP model imports and uses to define what is needed to setup IPsec.

Cheers.

> 
> Thanks,
> Acee
> 
> 
>> For IPsec protection of BGP, where are the details specified? 
>> Thanks,
>> Acee
>> 
>> On 12/10/19, 7:35 PM, "Idr on behalf of Mahesh Jethanandani" <idr-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of mjethanandani@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>   This is the second thread in the list of issues that were discussed in IETF 106 w.r.t. to BGP YANG model. This particular thread is to discuss the issue of defining how BGP sessions are going to be secured.
>> 
>>   As stated in Singapore, the model is being defined to secure BGP sessions using 
>>   - TCP AO
>>   - TCP MD5
>>   - IPSec
>> 
>>   In case there was a question of why MD5, it is because there are existing implementations that are choosing to stay with MD5, regardless of the issues that have been raised about MD5. The model therefore has to support such implementations.
>> 
>>   The model will use the ietf-key-chain model’s (RFC 8177) key-chain-ref to refer to an instance of the key chain. By doing that it will make use of the key rollover capability defined in that model, and for static key configuration by setting the end time to infinite in the key chain. The BGP model will leave the case of IPSec as TBD for now, and fill it when/if the IPSec YANG model is defined.
>> 
>>   Questions/Concerns?
>> 
>>   Mahesh Jethanandani
>>   mjethanandani@gmail.com
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>   _______________________________________________
>>   Idr mailing list
>>   Idr@ietf.org
>>   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr
>> 
>> 
> 
>    Mahesh Jethanandani
>    mjethanandani@gmail.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

Mahesh Jethanandani
mjethanandani@gmail.com