Re: [Idr] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-idr-sla-exchange-10

Ron: 

Thank you for the review.  I will let authors respond to you.   

Sue 

-----Original Message-----
From: Idr [mailto:idr-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ron Bonica
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2017 12:56 PM
To: rtg-dir@ietf.org; draft-ietf-idr-sla-exchange.all@ietf.org; idr@ietf.org
Subject: [Idr] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-idr-sla-exchange-10

Hello,

I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft. The Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related drafts as they pass through IETF last call and IESG review. The purpose of the review is to provide assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the Routing Directorate, please see http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/rtg/trac/wiki/RtgDir

Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs, it would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other IETF Last Call comments that you receive, and strive to resolve them through discussion or by updating the draft.

Document:  draft-ietf-idr-sla-exchange-10
Reviewer: Ron Bonica
Review Date:  2/16/2017
IETF LC End Date: TBD 
Intended Status: Standards Track

Summary: 

I have some minor concerns about this document that I think should be resolved before publication.

Comments: 

Major Issues: 

This document might benefit from discussion of operational issues. I assume that when a BGP listener learns a route with the SLA Exchange Attribute, it provisions class of service forwarding classes on interfaces. I also assume that a) it takes time to provision class of service forwarding classes and b) the number of forwarding classes that can be provisioned are finite. What does the BGP listener do when the number of forwarding classes requested exceeds its capacity to deliver? When a route flaps? How does the router protect itself

In the Security Considerations section, I am concerned about the possibility of intermediate AS's modifying the SLA Exchange Attribute. It seems that you need to have some degree of trust in every AS on the path (not only those included in the attribute)

Minor Issues: 

In Section 3.2, is the flag really needed? Doesn't an AS list containing only the receivers AS have exactly the same meaning?

Nits: 

Miscellaneous warnings:
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  == The document seems to use 'NOT RECOMMENDED' as an RFC 2119 keyword, but
     does not include the phrase in its RFC 2119 key words list.

  Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

     (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references
     to lower-maturity documents in RFCs)

  == Unused Reference: 'RFC2434' is defined on line 1279, but no explicit
     reference was found in the text

  == Unused Reference: 'RFC6793' is defined on line 1301, but no explicit
     reference was found in the text

  ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)

  ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4272

  ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 7132

  == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-netconf-restconf has been published as
     RFC 8040
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