Re: [Idr] IETF LC for IDR-ish document <draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05.txt> (Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies) to Proposed Standard

[Robert Raszuk <[e-mail]>]

>
> > And if you are customer and have 4 prefixes in BGP table thing are fine.
> If
> > you by accident become transit and advertise fulm table around I think we
> > can do better in BGP to protect from it then mandate policy.
>
> Evidence shows that, as of today, we can not.
>

​Have anyone actually tried ?​

The BGP origin validation was at least one attempt.

The other one could be as simple as *"ebgp policy auto"* where based in the
IRRDB and your peer's AS router can build a policy automagically using say
BGPQ3.

http://snar.spb.ru/prog/bgpq3/

Otherwise while Jared, you and perhaps most folks on this list already have
automated ways to build nice and accurate policies I suspect they are those
which do not. And those would either put "allow all" or will now start
looking for hints "what do I put in".

And if the end result is what you are doing twice a day why router's can't
do it themselves assuming IRRDB or any other src of truth is accurate ?

Best,
R.