Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs
Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Fri, 09 May 2014 17:05 UTC
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Date: Fri, 09 May 2014 13:05:27 -0400
From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
Organization: Santronics Software, Inc.
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To: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>, ietf-822@ietf.org
References: <20140506171238.28535.qmail@joyce.lan> <536A05B2.9060805@tana.it> <6.2.5.6.2.20140508104525.0c42ac38@resistor.net> <536CAC9C.6080807@tana.it>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-822/nkca0VczSC70RQRvJHywapXxyB4
Subject: Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs
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Alessandro, I believe what SM meant, is that every list developer has its own level of change needs and for the most part, in my view, you really don't want to make big changes to your mail framework when adding DKIM. Its complex. But for an integrated system when you have more controls of all the part, its doable. Take a look at our wcDKIM integration with our wcListServer component. http://www.winserver.com/public/files/wcdkim-ssi.png But in general, the main reason there is a general issue/problem with the general LS is because DKIM was added at the edge so it can "blindly" sign all the outbound mail. The key word here is "Blindly." Overall, the MLS change requirements to make the MLS more "fitting" with the blind DKIM signer component is: 1) Subscription controls for restrictive domains, 2) Submission controls for restrictive domains, and 3) "Meta" information to tell the signer not to sign a particular list. Where and how those things are done will vary. Unless the MLS developer does it himself, it will be asking much of list operators to handle this complexity themselves. So makes you understand why is far easier for the LSP (List Service Provider) and/or resigner market to just ignore all Author Domain Signing Practice protocol and just allow for a complete open ended DKIM signing network when perhaps the only signature that matters most, is that last one in the transport chain and as long as the receiver trust the last signer, it really doesn't matter what the author does or the previous resigners had done. Unfortunately, its a GOOD versus BAD framework. With the signer trust, you can only look for the GOOD. It doesn't know how to handle the BAD and that is what the author domain signing protocols attempts to address and the trust folks keep forgetting or don't wish to deal with -- the bad legacy spoofing/phishing mail that Trust people can't do anything about. -- HLS On 5/9/2014 6:23 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote: > Hi SM, > > On Thu 08/May/2014 19:59:19 +0200 S Moonesamy wrote: >> At 03:06 07-05-2014, Alessandro Vesely wrote: >>> to "standardize" its syntax.[3] It seems to me that eliminating some >>> of such gratuitous changes is the solution to DMARC-for-MLs which >>> minimizes the alterations in MLM software. Are you sure it won't >>> work? >> >> This mailing list breaks the DKIM Signature. > > No, it doesn't. It broke elandsys' signature, but check tana's > signature on this message. (I send this to ietf-822 only, to avoid > any confusion.) > > So it seems I could publish a strict DMARC policy right now, and cause > minimal disruptions. However, some verifiers (NetEase) consider > tana's h= inadequate, see "objection" below. > >> Gratuitous changes to a mailing list message is a matter of >> opinion. > > Well, not exactly. > > For corrections, section 6.4 of RFC 5321 is rather clear that > submission servers MAY, while intermediate relays MUST NOT, apply > certain changes. So the range where opinions may vary is whether an > MLM is to be considered akin to submission servers or relays. > > By /gratuitous/ changes, such as adding/removing double quote marks, I > mean unnecessary embellishments that were already disputable before > DKIM took root. > >> I suggest reading the past discussions first if you are interested >> in trying to make it work. > > Yes, much of this discussion was recited at the time of ADSP, for > example http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2010q3/013829.html > > The most relevant objection to weak signatures is why would domains so > concerned about security as to publish a strong policy weaken their > DKIM signatures? A solution is to do so for ML messages only. > > To recap, assume a domain has a DB of (user, mailing list) pairs which > defines ML traffic. Messages to ML are then sent in separate SMTP > transactions and weakly signed. MLMs sign those messages in turn, > using strong signatures. Verifiers derive the validity of MLM domains > by comparing d= against To: or Cc: mailboxes. > > Besides minor refinements, the major bar is to build that DB. I > proposed to do it manually for starting, and then find out how to > automate its maintenance. > > Ale >
- [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Theodore Ts'o
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] A permission to re-sign header Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] don't need a permission to re-sign… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] don't need a permission to re-sign… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] don't need a permission to re-sign… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] don't need a permission to re-sign… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Douglas Otis
- [ietf-822] We need a DKIM Policy Working Group Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] We need a DKIM Policy Working Group S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Pete Resnick
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Hector Santos
- [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to... Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Rolf E. Sonneveld
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Arnt Gulbrandsen
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Arnt Gulbrandsen
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Bart Schaefer
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Michael Richardson
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Russ Allbery
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Arnt Gulbrandsen
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Russ Allbery
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Scott Kitterman
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Russ Allbery
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Miles Fidelman
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Russ Allbery
- [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs S Moonesamy
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-822] WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to.… Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-822] Aptness of DKIM for MLs Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permissi… Douglas Otis