Last Call: <draft-ietf-mls-architecture-10.txt> (The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture) to Informational RFC

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Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-mls-architecture-10.txt> (The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture) to Informational RFC
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The IESG has received a request from the Messaging Layer Security WG (mls) to
consider the following document: - 'The Messaging Layer Security (MLS)
  <draft-ietf-mls-architecture-10.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the mailing lists by 2023-01-16. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.


   The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol (I-D.ietf-mls-protocol)
   specification has the role of defining a Group Key Agreement
   protocol, including all the cryptographic operations and
   serialization/deserialization functions necessary for scalable and
   secure group messaging.  The MLS protocol is meant to protect against
   eavesdropping, tampering, message forgery, and provide further
   properties such as Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security
   (PCS) in the case of past or future device compromises.

   This document describes a general secure group messaging
   infrastructure and its security goals.  It provides guidance on
   building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy
   tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of
   the MLS protocol (e.g., frequency of public encryption key rotation).

   The document also provides guidance for parts of the infrastructure
   that are not standardized by the MLS Protocol document and left to
   the application or the infrastructure architects to design.

   While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to
   follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, they affect
   the overall security guarantees that are achieved by a messaging
   application.  This is especially true in case of active adversaries
   that are able to compromise clients, the delivery service, or the
   authentication service.

The file can be obtained via

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.