WG Review: EAP Method Update (emu)

The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Tue, 10 June 2025 21:00 UTC

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Subject: WG Review: EAP Method Update (emu)
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The EAP Method Update (emu) WG in the Security Area of the IETF is undergoing
rechartering. The IESG has not made any determination yet. The following
draft charter was submitted, and is provided for informational purposes only.
Please send your comments to the IESG mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by
2025-06-20.

EAP Method Update (emu)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Current status: Active WG

Chairs:
  Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
  Peter Yee <peter@akayla.com>

Assigned Area Director:
  Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>

Security Area Directors:
  Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
  Deb Cooley <debcooley1@gmail.com>

Mailing list:
  Address: emu@ietf.org
  To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
  Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/emu

Group page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/emu/

Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-emu/

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network access
authentication framework used, for instance, in VPN and mobile networks. EAP
itself is a simple protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
Several EAP methods have been developed at the IETF and support for EAP
exists in a broad set of devices. Previous larger EAP-related efforts at the
IETF included rewriting the base EAP specification and the development of
several Standards Track EAP methods. This Working Group will therefore
provide guidance and update EAP method specifications where necessary to
enable the use of new versions of these underlying technologies.

EAP authentication is based on credentials available on a peer and a server.
However, some EAP methods use credentials that are time or domain limited
(such as EAP-POTP), and there may be a need for creating long term
credentials for re-authenticating the peer in a more general context. This
Working Group will investigate minimal mechanisms with which limited-use EAP
authentication credentials can be used for creating general-use long-term
credentials.

Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) is a very compact and lightweight
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys that is
suitable in constrained environments in which many of the existing EAP
methods are not a good fit. EDHOC offers the useful properties of mutual
authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. This Working Group
will accordingly produce a specification for an EAP method incorporating the
EDHOC mechanism (RFC 9528).

While TLS-based EAP mechanisms provide strong channel protections, if the
client does not authenticate and validate the server's credentials properly
(possibly owing to a lack of provisioned information necessary to undertake
that validation), an EAP mechanism running over TLS that relies on passwords
is vulnerable to client credential theft, much the same as password
authentication over plain TLS is. The FIDO Alliance and the W3C have
developed a passwordless authentication scheme known as FIDO2, which combines
elements of the W3C's WebAuthn and FIDO's CTAP standards. This Working Group
will devise an EAP method suitable for use with passwordless authentication
schemes such as the CTAP2 version of FIDO2.

While some EAP methods can provide some privacy there still can be a leakage
of information as to which networks a particular user is accessing. Privacy
pass protocols and tokens provide mechanisms to protect the user's privacy in
this situation. This Working Group will work on an EAP method based on
Privacy Pass that provides privacy by preventing a visited network or service
from knowing the identity of a user, and for keeping the user's identity
provider from tracking what networks or services the user is accessing.

In summary, the Working Group shall produce the following Standards Track
documents:

* Documents for the maintenance and update of existing EAP protocols

* Define mechanisms by which EAP methods can support creation of long-term
credentials for the peer based on initial limited-use credentials.

* Develop an EAP method for use in constrained environments that wish to
leverage the EDHOC key exchange mechanism.

* Devise a passwordless EAP method that can incorporate use of CTAP2 or other
similar authentication mechanism.

* EAP method based on Privacy Pass that provides privacy by preventing a
visited network or service from knowing the identity of a user, and for
keeping the user's identity provider from tracking what networks or services
the user is accessing.

The working group is expected to stay in close collaboration with the EAP
deployment community, the TLS working group (for work on TLS based EAP
methods), the FIDO Alliance, and the 3GPP security architecture group (for
EAP-AKA' work).

Milestones:

  Jun 2025 - WG adopts initial draft on an EAP method based on Privacy Pass

  Jun 2025 - EAP-TLSPOK - submit to IESG

  Sep 2025 - TEAP - resubmit to IESG

  Nov 2025 - EAP-EDHOC - submit to IESG

  Jul 2026 - EAP-FIDO - Submit to IESG