Document Action: 'Threat Model for BGP Path Security' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-09.txt)

The IESG <> Thu, 02 January 2014 17:23 UTC

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Subject: Document Action: 'Threat Model for BGP Path Security' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-09.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Threat Model for BGP Path Security'
  (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-09.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working

The IESG contact persons are Stewart Bryant and Adrian Farrel.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:

Technical Summary

   SIDR was re-chartered to develop solutions for a specific BGP 
   security problem, i.e., how to enable an AS to verify that the 
   AS_Path represented in BGP route is the same as the path 
   through which the NLRI travelled. This document examines 
   threats and attacks on BGP relative to this goal. It begins 
   with a brief characterization of threats (motivated, capable 
   adversaries) and then describes classes of attacks. The attack 
   characterization focuses on elements of the routing system, 
   including the RPKI and likely approaches to path security. 
   (The current SIDR charter calls for building upon the RPKI, 
   hence its inclusion in this document.) The document ends 
   with a brief discussion of residual vulnerabilities, e.g. routing 
   security concerns that are outside the scope of SIDR’s charter.

Working Group Summary

   SIDR was initially chartered to develop standards to enable 
   network operators to verify route origin assertions propagated 
   via BGP. It published a set of RFCs (6480-93) that addressed 
   this initial problem statement. Initial versions of the threat 
   document and the requirements document were published 
   at about the same time (June 2011). A threat document is 
   nominally a precursor for a requirements document, but 
   there was an informal understanding of the threats to 
   be addressed, which permitted parallel development 
   of these documents, by different sets of authors.

Document Quality

The document is clearly written and well organized.


 Alexey Melnikov is the Document Shepherd.
 Stewart Bryant is the Responsible Area Director.

RFC Editor Note

Please Delete:
"8.  Acknowledgements