Last Call: <draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-07.txt> (SMTP Require TLS Option) to Proposed Standard

The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Fri, 25 January 2019 15:00 UTC

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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-07.txt> (SMTP Require TLS Option) to Proposed Standard
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CC: uta-chairs@ietf.org, valery@smyslov.net, draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls@ietf.org, uta@ietf.org, Valery Smyslov <valery@smyslov.net>, alexey.melnikov@isode.com
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Message-ID: <154842843614.29150.7231551831323471834.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 07:00:36 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/blv2QyugmeddzUgdiozjag71j_4>

The IESG has received a request from the Using TLS in Applications WG (uta)
to consider the following document: - 'SMTP Require TLS Option'
  <draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-07.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-02-08. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level
   encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security
   standpoint as it might be because of its opportunistic nature;
   message delivery is, by default, prioritized over security.  This
   document describes an SMTP service extension, REQUIRETLS, and message
   header field, RequireTLS.  If the REQUIRETLS option or RequireTLS
   message header field is used when sending a message, it asserts a
   request on the part of the message sender to override the default
   negotiation of TLS, either by requiring that TLS be negotiated when
   the message is relayed, or by requesting that recipient-side policy
   mechanisms such as MTA-STS and DANE be ignored when relaying a
   message for which security is unimportant.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

Last Call: <draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-07.tx… The IESG