Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-07.txt> (Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security) to Proposed Standard

The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Thu, 20 March 2025 04:19 UTC

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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-07.txt> (Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security) to Proposed Standard
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Message-ID: <174244437393.809125.6979014216737899644@dt-datatracker-5b9b68c5b6-zxk6z>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 21:19:33 -0700
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CC: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt@ietf.org, ipsec@ietf.org, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/m6fr9mqDZhNSoLpi2HbRj1CYrno>

The IESG has received a request from the IP Security Maintenance and
Extensions WG (ipsecme) to consider the following document: - 'Mixing
Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security'
  <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-07.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2025-04-02. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   An Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) extension defined
   in RFC8784 allows IPsec traffic to be protected against someone
   storing VPN communications today and decrypting them later, when (and
   if) cryptographically relevant quantum computers are available.  The
   protection is achieved by means of Post-quantum Preshared Key (PPK)
   which is mixed into the session keys calculation.  However, this
   protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which might be
   unacceptable in some scenarios.  This specification defines an
   alternative way to get protection against quantum computers, which is
   similar to the solution defined in RFC8784, but protects the initial
   IKEv2 SA too.

   RFC8784 assumes that PPKs are static and thus they are only used when
   an initial IKEv2 Security Association (SA) is created.  If a fresh
   PPK is available before the IKE SA expired, then the only way to use
   it is to delete the current IKE SA and create a new one from scratch,
   which is inefficient.  This specification defines a way to use PPKs
   in active IKEv2 SAs for creating additional IPsec SAs and rekey
   operations.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-07.tx… The IESG