Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and a need for a definition
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 19 November 2013 10:04 UTC
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Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 10:04:00 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
References: <20131119093343.GA9282@nic.fr> <528B31B4.5050005@cisco.com> <20131119094626.GA11078@nic.fr>
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Subject: Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and a need for a definition
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Hiya, On 11/19/2013 09:46 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 10:39:00AM +0100, > Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote > a message of 55 lines which said: > >> in fact there are several different forms. > > I find three: > > 1) Encryption without a peer-specific arrangement. This is the meaning > used in RFC 4322. Can be safe. So I (1) that to mean that there's a not-so-secure way to validate that the right key for a peer is being used, in 4322 via DNS without DNSSEC. Adding DNSSEC gets you beyond OE I'd say. > 2) Encryption without authentication. This is the meaning used in RFC > 5386. Safe only against a purely passive attacker. > > 3) Encryption with a fallback to unencrypted mode. This is the > Wikipedia definition. Certainly unsafe. > > draft-cooper-ietf-privacy-requirements-01 mixes 1) and 2) That's a fair comment. Since the draft is calling for a minimum I think (2) is more appropriate for now since there will be some places where its not feasible to get (1). When we push out another rev, we'll make that clear, specific text suggestions are welcome too of course. >> As such, it's a good opportunity for an informational document. > > Volunteers are welcome to start from the list above :-) Actually, I'd like (if possible) to go a bit further than simply definitions, I think the info document we want is a "HOWTO pimp my protocol with OE" spec, but for that to be done well, I think we need an author or two who's recently e.g. implemented ECDH in protocols. I've asked someone but they're busy, if you know someone who could do that then either twist their arm yourself or point me at 'em. (Or if that describes you, then either write something or get in touch with me.) Trying to get an implementer like that does make it a bit harder to get started, but if the resulting RFC is to be really useful, I think it'll need to be fairly high quality since it could end up being used in lots of protocols, probably via ^C^V, so getting it right will be more important than usual perhaps. Cheers, S. > _______________________________________________ > ietf-privacy mailing list > ietf-privacy@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-privacy > >
- [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and a n… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Eliot Lear
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Eliot Lear
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Scott Brim
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Dean Willis
- Re: [ietf-privacy] "Opportunistic encryption" and… Fred Baker (fred)