Re: [ietf-privacy] [Internet Policy] How a Radio Shack Robbery Could Spur a New Era in Digital Privacy

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Tue, 28 November 2017 06:51 UTC

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 17:51:26 +1100
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To: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
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Subject: Re: [ietf-privacy] [Internet Policy] How a Radio Shack Robbery Could Spur a New Era in Digital Privacy
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On 28 Nov 2017, at 7:41 am, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
> 
> http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-carpenter-eyewitness-rule/

Interesting, when looked at through the lens of the e2e crypto debate:

> The second kind of case considered when disclosure from inside a protected space eliminated privacy. The Supreme Court decided a long string of those cases in the decade before Katz. And it consistently adopted a simple rule: A person who knowingly exposed private information from a private space to outside observation waived Fourth Amendment protection.

[...]

> First, a space had to be protected, which was the case if society was willing to recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable there. Second, the person had to “exhibit” an actual expectation of privacy, an intention “to keep” the protected space “to himself,” by not exposing the space “to the plain view of outsiders.”

So, it seems like (IANAL) one way to read the situation is that the government is currently trying to get companies to forcefully take the expectation of privacy off the table for commonly used communication tools.

I wonder what the analysis is WRT back doors vs. "keep the plaintext" (what they currently seem to be pursuing). The latter seems to sidestep the second test above...

(Of course, I'm just a bystander here, and could be very wrong, but would be interested to understand why)


--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/