Re: WCIT outcome?

["Fred Baker (fred)" <[e-mail]>]

On Jan 1, 2013, at 10:36 AM, Alessandro Vesely <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Was D.1 to ease wire tapping?  By example, I, as a mail server operator
> who is not a telecom, am not required by my country's laws to provide an
> instrumentation whereby authorized investigators can obtain a list of a
> user's correspondents on the fly.  Yet that kind of data is said to be
> essential for police operations.  OTOH, SMTP doesn't consider that kind
> of facilities, and fashionable implementations don't provide them.  What
> am I missing?

In most countries, wiretap laws apply to public facilities. An enterprise mail server isn't a public facility.

> Perhaps, as the old telephone system is fading away, the institutions
> that founded it --local governments' branches-- should change their
> mindset or just fade away as well...  Should the IETF or other SDOs help
> such transition?

If you want something to fade away, making a fuss about it isn't a useful approach. The IETF's practice in the past has been to improve the Internet; I tend to think that's as it should be.

That said, I'm also of the opinion that preventing a police force from conducting a proper criminal investigation is not a path to success. We like to say that the Internet routes around brokenness; so do police forces and legislative bodies. They define "brokenness" as anything that prevents them from doing their job, the same way we do. What I would far rather see is a set of technical mechanisms and supporting law that facilitate legitimate criminal investigations and expose the other kind.