Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to savingthe Internet from the NSA

Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Fri, 06 September 2013 15:23 UTC

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Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to savingthe Internet from the NSA
From: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
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Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 17:23:09 +0200
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To: Scott Brim <scott.brim@gmail.com>
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hi Scott, all,

On Sep 6, 2013, at 3:45 PM, Scott Brim <scott.brim@gmail.com> wrote:

> I wouldn't focus on government surveillance per se.  The IETF should
> consider that breaking privacy is much easier than it used to be,
> particularly given consolidation of services at all layers, and take
> that into account in our engineering best practices.  Our mission is
> to make the Internet better, and right now the Internet's weakness in
> privacy is far from "better".

Indeed, pervasive surveillance is merely a special case of eavesdropping as a privacy threat, with the important difference that eavesdropping (as discussed in RFC 6973) explicitly has an target in mind, while pervasive surveillance explicitly doesn't. So what we do to improve privacy will naturally make surveillance harder, in most cases; I hope that draft-trammell-perpass-ppa will evolve to fill in the gaps.

> The mandatory security considerations
> section should become security and privacy considerations.  The
> privacy RFC should be expanded and worded more strongly than just nice
> suggestions.  Perhaps the Nomcom should ask candidates about their
> understanding of privacy considerations.

Having read RFC 6973 in detail while working on that draft, I'd say it's a very good starting point, and indeed even consider it required reading. We can certainly take its guidance to heart as if it were more strongly worded than it is. :)

Cheers,

Brian