Re: Trust and provacy problems with draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy

S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Mon, 05 May 2014 17:24 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 May 2014 09:50:15 -0700
To: Raphaël Durand <mail@raphaeldurand.fr>, ietf@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
Subject: Re: Trust and provacy problems with draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy
In-Reply-To: <536775D2.4090708@raphaeldurand.fr>
References: <536775D2.4090708@raphaeldurand.fr>
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Cc: "gb3635@att.com" <dd5826@att.com>, Gus Bourg <gb3635@att.com>, Mohammad Hafeez <mh2897@att.com>
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Hi Raphaël,
At 04:28 05-05-2014, Raphaël Durand wrote:
>I've just read the draft 
>draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy, and 
>I see a lot of trust and privacy problem in this "Explicit auth proxy".
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy/?include_text=1

In Section 3.1:

   "To help end users understand the reason why the proxy is offered (in
    other words, the benefits of having the proxy in the path)"

Section 6.1 of one of the drafts being referenced 
has some text about "Living with Interception".

I did not comment about the questions in your 
message as the authors are better placed to answer them.

>"To ensure the trustfulness of proxies, 
>certification authorities validation procedure 
>for issuing proxy certificates should be more 
>rigorous than for issuing normal certificates 
>and may also include technical details and 
>processes relevant for the security assurance."

There was a problem in December 2013 about a 
certificate which had been "mis-issued".

I could not find any discussion about "pervasive 
monitoring" in the Security Considerations 
section.  Did the authors consider that?

BYW, I posted a request for feedback at 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/perpass/current/msg01735.html 
It would help me if you (or anyone else) could 
comment on the perpass mailing list.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy