Re: [IETF] Re: Montevideo statement

Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> Tue, 15 October 2013 12:19 UTC

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Subject: Re: [IETF] Re: Montevideo statement
From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2013 15:19:43 +0300
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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On Oct 15, 2013, at 2:20 PM, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:

>> The ccTLD system grew up at a time when many governments were
>> fairly hostile to the Internet and/or the DNS (that is different
>> from being hostile to, e.g., free and private flow of
>> information over the Internet).  The ccTLD environment still
>> supports ccTLD administrations that are independent of the local
>> government unless that government is so hostile to them that it
>> is willing to use national law to force them out.  One
>> consequence of that model is that, for the ccTLD system to
>> function, neither IANA nor anyone else needs to figure out who
>> is the actual, legitimate, government of a country.  Governments
>> have a tendency to be quite jealous of their rights to
>> "recognize" other governments (or not).  Keeping IANA out of
>> that business was an explicit goal at the time RFC 1591 was
>> written, for multiple reasons.
>> 
>> If the government of a country is the required root of trust in
>> that country's ccTLD, we take ourselves several steps closer to
>> requiring that governments approve ccTLD administrations (not
>> merely not being actively opposed to them).  We create an attack
>> vector from the government on the ccTLD and registrations in it.
>> Unlike shutting down a ccTLD administration by offering to throw
>> its membership in jail, the control and mechanisms that implies
>> may not require whatever passes for due process in that country.
>> And such trust authority can provide a vector for required
>> government approval of individual registrations and registrants,
>> just as the US Government has turned a general IANA oversight
>> requirement into case-by-case approval of root entries.
>> 
>> Be careful what you wish for.
> 
> +1
> 


Dislike doing this, but:
+1

W

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