Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> Thu, 25 February 2010 00:17 UTC

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Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2010 01:19:27 +0100
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Subject: Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, IETF Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>
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On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 1:07 AM, Masataka Ohta
<mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote:
> Mark Andrews wrote:
>
>>>>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dempsky-dnscurve-00
>>>
>>>As I read the draft, it seems to me that DNSCurve without Curve
>>>(that is, with 96 bit nonce of DNSCurve as an extended message
>>>ID without elliptic curve cryptography) is secure enough.
>
>> Except from players that can see the query.
>
> That's not a new cryptographical problem.
>
> As DNSCurve protection is like DH, it is subject to MitM attacks,
> which is no different from simple nonce.

Not really. I Don't know what you mean by simple nonce, but as I
understand dnscurve if implemented properly would have ssh-style
authentication. Only the first request of the server key is vulnerable
with mitm. Then it should be cached.

regards,
Nikos