Re: [HOKEY] EMSK Issue

Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu> Mon, 24 March 2008 02:20 UTC

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Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2008 22:17:41 -0400
From: Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
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To: "Narayanan, Vidya" <vidyan@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [HOKEY] EMSK Issue
References: <47DF04FC.4060706@cs.umd.edu> <A3DA4C2546E1614D8ACC896746CDCF29E7BF6E@aruba-mx1.arubanetworks.com> <C24CB51D5AA800449982D9BCB90325130142DBF9@NAEX13.na.qualcomm.com>
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Cc: Glen Zorn <gzorn@arubanetworks.com>, ietf@ietf.org, hokey@ietf.org, Bernard Aboba <bernarda@windows.microsoft.com>
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Vidya,

 > ... do the responsible thing, which would be to clearly define the
 > applicability, along with providing an interoperable means of defining
 > the key hierarchy for those usages that want to/can use it.

This is all I'm suggesting we do.  I think we should add text to the 
document that gives guidance on the types of usages for which a USRK 
would be appropriate.  Usages should be for functions related to the 
access network to which you are connecting, and for functions where it 
is reasonable for your access network to have an interest in authorization.

For example, consider using a USRK to secure HTTP.  If your access 
provider did this to deliver firmware updates to your handset, this 
might be reasonable, but if amazon.com required it for authentication, 
this would be unreasonable.  Even if amazon.com had an agreement with 
your provider to obtain a USRK for your session, that's not the kind of 
thing for which your provider should be the authorization authority.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland
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