Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Sun, 11 April 2021 00:07 UTC

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Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: ietf@ietf.org
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2021 17:07:23 -0700
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On 4/10/21 1:39 PM, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 10, 2021 at 12:59:34PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
>> Let me ask a pointed question: if we used DANE+DNSSec do we have confidence
>> in the security of the solution? I think we'd have to have a lot of
>> confidence in both that they are really ready for prime time.
> I do, for the reasons I gave.  It can't be worse than WebPKI, that's for
> sure.  At least in a pre-post-quantum world.  In a PQ world I suspect
> we'd want to have something more akin to a PKI + Needham-Schroeder to
> optimize PQ PK.
>
> I think I would prefer a single-root PKIX PKI with name constraints to
> DNSSEC/DANE.  Perhaps we can still get that by getting registries/
> registrars to operate name-constrained CAs, and replace WebPKI with a
> DNS-parallel PKI.  But at this point DNSSEC/DANE seems much more
> realistic as a way to get to a single-root name constrained PKI for
> domainnames.  Also, DNSSEC can do secure denial of existence while PKIX
> cannot because wheras DNSSEC is based on a directory (DNS), x.509/PKIX,
> though it was meant to be used with directories (DAP) doesn't really
> have a viable global directory scheme (imagine using LDAP as we use
> DNS!), and doesn't have a directory that can do secure denial of
> existence either.
My take on DNSSec is that I only understand some of the large contours 
but that I trust that IETF process would not produce something a 
complete flop from a technical standpoint, though that does happen too. 
But DNS is pretty damn important, so I hope the clue level looking it 
was intense. The biggest IETF failing is solving problems nobody needs 
solved. Maybe DANE can be a sleeper that was just ahead of its time.