Re: [IETF] back by popular demand - a DNS calculator

Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu> Thu, 21 February 2013 03:46 UTC

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Subject: Re: [IETF] back by popular demand - a DNS calculator
From: Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 22:46:40 -0500
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To: "Carlos M. martinez" <carlosm3011@gmail.com>
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On Feb 20, 2013, at 9:46 PM, Carlos M. martinez <carlosm3011@gmail.com> wrote:

> Wasn't the 'evil bit' able to hold the value 2 ?
> 
Yes, but we need an RFC for that.  From RFC 3514:

6. IANA Considerations

   This document defines the behavior of security elements for the 0x0
   and 0x1 values of this bit.  Behavior for other values of the bit may
   be defined only by IETF consensus [RFC2434].


		--Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb