Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com> Thu, 21 August 2014 04:37 UTC
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From: Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com>
To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 00:37:35 -0400
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On Thursday, August 21, 2014 02:18:29 Stephen Farrell wrote: > Personally, I think the probability that we suddenly discover > any significantly better term is negligible. Not because OS > is super-good, but rather because nothing is super-good. And > good-enough should be good-enough here. > > In fact, I'd say so its so negligible that attempting to find > such (yet again, maybe for the 8th time?) is counterproductive. > > But that doesn't stop folks genuinely trying seemingly, I guess > its too tempting a windmill at which to tilt;-) > > But I'd appeal to others to consider this before they chime in > here: is your suggestion really that much better that everyone > will immediately say "yeah, that's the one we wanted!"? If not, > them maybe there's not much point in suggesting it. > > S. I think -03 was an improvement over -02, but I think we're in danger of regressing. I was able to find time to give the diff of the rewritten draft someone posted a quick read and my overall impression was that it did not represent progress. That's an overly terse comment for the amount of effort that went into it, but that's all I have time for. I think -03 does a reasonably good job of describing OS and we should call it mostly done. Scott K
- Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Paul Wouters
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Dave Crocker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Scott Kitterman
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Christian Huitema
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Paul Wouters
- Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Theodore Ts'o
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Michael StJohns
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Dave Crocker
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Mark Andrews
- Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (w… Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Ted Hardie
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Hosnieh Rafiee
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Nico Williams
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger