Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06.txt> (Recommendations on the Filtering of IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers) to Informational RFC

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Sat, 24 November 2018 20:30 UTC

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Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06.txt> (Recommendations on the Filtering of IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers) to Informational RFC
To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Cc: "C. M. Heard" <heard@pobox.com>, OPSEC <opsec@ietf.org>, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 20:29:55 +0000
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Brian E Carpenter wrote on 24/11/2018 20:17:
> Operators make their own
> decisions, so I think that is what the draft should say. Something like:
> 
> 3.5.5.  Advice
> 
>     Operators should determine according to their own circumstances
>     whether to discard packets containing unknown IPv6 EHs.
> 
> And at the same time, delete the 2nd and 3rd sentences of this:
> 
> 3.5.3.  Specific Security Implications
> 
>     For obvious reasons, it is impossible to determine specific security
>     implications of unknown IPv6 EHs.  However, from security standpoint,
>     a device should discard IPv6 extension headers for which the security
>     implications cannot be determined.  We note that this policy is
>     allowed by [RFC7045].

This looks like a sensible approach.

> I don't expect these changes to have much impact in the real world,
> however.

Indeed.  The real world is more complex than can be easily encapsulated 
in a draft like this, and it changes more quickly than rfcs.

Nick