Re: [IAB] last call discussion status on draft-iab-2870bis

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> Fri, 06 March 2015 01:51 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 20:51:31 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Subject: Re: [IAB] last call discussion status on draft-iab-2870bis
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On Fri, Mar 06, 2015 at 10:57:42AM +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> 
> To get the DNSSEC records added the the responses the server needs
> to be able to see the DO=1 bit.

Last I checked, the draft was a requirements document, not an
enforcement checklist for the heretofore missing Protocol Police
Force.  If you could point to a piece of the relevant RFCs that make
partial EDNS support or something like that acceptable to make DNSSEC
work, then I think you'd have an argument.  So far, you have not
offered such an argument.

> I'm sure all the TLD operators listed in tld-report.html [1] with
> broken implementations think they are doing EDNS correctly.

The draft before us has absolutely nothing to do with TLD operations.
As you've pointed out repeatedly, you have written some drafts on the
topic of not being foolish when operating DNS servers.  I'm sure the
IETF will, in due course, give those drafts the attention they
deserve.  In the interim, however, I don't see how all those other
levels of the DNS are entirely relevant to the present discussion, and
I think we ought to stick to this topic.  You have not made an
argument that is specifically relevant to the root and that addresses
the formal dependence of DNSSEC on EDNS.  Therefore, I believe your
suggested changes should not be incorporated.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com