Re: Interest in a push-based two-factor auth standard?

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Wed, 08 March 2017 02:02 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2017 21:02:49 -0500
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Subject: Re: Interest in a push-based two-factor auth standard?
To: Alex Jordan <alex@strugee.net>
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On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 3:37 PM, Alex Jordan <alex@strugee.net> wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 06, 2017 at 08:05:11AM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> > What we are discussing goes beyond two factor auth. If you have a cell
> > phone with a device specific signature key, it can sign the response
> which
> > means that you automatically collect up a non repudiable audit log of the
> > user's actions. This is beyond anything possible with OTP number
> sequences
> > or USB dongles.
>
> Indeed. I suspect there are a lot of unexplored uses for such a
> standard, but haven't explored it fully yet. (Note also that the lack
> of deniability could be seen as a positive thing _or_ a negative
> thing, depending.)
>
> > ​i am interested and have developed several protocols of this type using
> > JSON. My work provides prior art back to 2010 at the very least.
>
> Are there any public references for this work?
>

https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-owcp-00.txt
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-sxs-confirm-02

​That is not the latest version.​ There might even be a later published
version.

I have code. The reason I have not updated the drafts is that right now I
am working on the problem of binding all the user's devices together so
that they can respond to a confirmation request from their phone or their
watch or any other device(s) they pick. Each device always signs with a
unique device key however so the signatures can be tracked back to the
device used.





> I think what makes most sense at this point is for me to draw up a
> rough Internet draft and then send it to the Security area and see
> what they think the best way forward is. Looking at prior work will
> probably aid in the design of such a draft.
>
> Does that seem okay to those who have expressed interest in this?
>
> Cheers!
>
> AJ
>