Re: (short version) Re: Last Call: <draft-faltstrom-uri-10.txt> (The Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) DNS Resource Record) to Proposed Standard

[Patrik Fältström <[e-mail]>]

> On 27 Feb 2015, at 10:24, Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 09:41:42AM +0100, Patrik F?ltstr?m wrote:
> 
>> So the difference for MX is that the MX model using TLS is wrong.
> 
> Specifically, absent DNSSEC+DANE, it is unwise to assume that much
> if any security against active attacks results from using the MX
> hostname as a peer identity attested via Web PKI CAs.
> 
>> Then SRV, can you explain that?
>> 
>> http://example.com/
>> 
>> Lookup of SRV for _web._tcp.example.com
> 
> Again "nobody" does that for HTTPS (well none of the browsers or
> typical web client toolkits do).  Of course someone is probably
> doing it some dark corner of the Internet, but they lose all the
> usual security properties of TLS (unless they are also doing DNSSEC
> + DANE in this case).

I understand that part, but for me (maybe wrongly) I think "badly designed RR Type" is a different argument than "SRV is different from URI". If both are crap, then I understand :-)

> Plus SRV records don't specify a URI scheme, which can potentially
> change the client's security expectations.

Ok, got it! Thanks!

> SRV records are used for LDAP lookups, often with GSSAPI auth, and
> Microsoft (for example) gets it right in creating special principals
> for the LDAP servers:
> 
>    ldap/<target-fqdn>/<service-domain-fqdn>@REALM

Ok.

> allowing clients to check that the target of the SRV record.
> Admittedly GSSAPI often plays out behind enterprise firewalls,
> where a lot more insecure DNS redirection is often tolerated than
> might be wise on the public Internet.
> 
> There is a proposal in RFC 6186 to use SRV records for MUAs
> discovering the appropriate IMAP service for their domain.  This
> RFC predates DANE, and as I said "drops the ball on the user's lap"
> by requiring the user to confirm the redirection.  Even the UTA
> DEEP draft does not fully address that issue, thought makes a step
> or two in the right direction.
> 
> It sure looks like everyone is still rather hesitant around DNSSEC.

Yeah, for some for me weird reason...

"Just do it!"

I am btw also of the view that DNSSEC is so darn important that I think having validation in (the trusted) recursive resolver one uses is better than using the current CA/X.509 PKI. Sure, local validation in application is much much better, but I rather have/use DNSSEC with validation in recursive resolver than no DNSSEC.

I.e. if I do not trust the zeroconf we have today, then I am sort of toast anyways.

>> Get back for example 8080 example.net
>> 
>> http://example.net:8080/
>> 
>> What I am trying to understand is the _difference_ between URI and MX/SRV which was what Sam said there was.
> 
> Applications that use SRV records with TLS, see:
> 
>    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-srv
> 
> generally use the service domain (not target host) as the reference
> identifier, unless they are luck enough to support DNSSEC and DANE
> and find a TLSA record for the target host (which was obtained via
> a "secure" SRV RRset).
> 
> HTTP clients that do TLS, don't do SRV records, or don't understand
> the security implications.  All I'm saying is that the security
> implications are non-trivial and need discussion.

Thanks!

That they are non-trivial, absolutely!

I was the statement by Sam that SRV and MX did *not* have these security implications URI have I wanted to know more about.

   Patrik