Re: What ASN.1 got right

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Thu, 04 March 2021 19:17 UTC

Return-Path: <mike@fresheez.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45D273A14BB for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 11:17:44 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.749
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.749 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.25, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mtcc.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w73HJ4XQe2EV for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 11:17:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-pf1-x42a.google.com (mail-pf1-x42a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5E183A14B9 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 11:17:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-pf1-x42a.google.com with SMTP id 192so12642139pfv.0 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 04 Mar 2021 11:17:42 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mtcc.com; s=fluffulence; h=subject:to:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version :in-reply-to:content-language; bh=9kKnZPyNSQcprXiVRmuAzX75E6XfkUSCbDgHYZkKH4c=; b=lpaDU4Adw8ujeOWBpo3+AcfsAmDs+JfMEN3RNmS+GRcdY3YlaSR2KKA8rNmxs20h8q 5OECauGm+D1A8hu0h56WSzE1dYAR8Gj3sE0pcLtKFbbv6DhINDciWUDKQY6QA73zCWJF UPqq7xdjWKV8qqetE8pY2gGKGxqARYcOh7HX5my1aAgnGuabIKgUcU2j4Gb6NjRqY+sr gBZZQS1w6M/P+B2Kykf8+MBjh4PK/lDak1XlaChrH1FoojteL3zbRx8ZDifCe59Q/SO6 PFjiwaVNaSrkVlZSgMFHvA2xfWlN2g1qDnx4X6oNYcIYhSKU9SZvrizEOjYaccEZO9NK fu9w==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=9kKnZPyNSQcprXiVRmuAzX75E6XfkUSCbDgHYZkKH4c=; b=av2z1hHMLweAi9sTzJZ72GpmU3U16DkRjWOaO7RhlPEkrR9yOrRYbZjCLTcFOGUjfq R749OZedutlkYh2rpI3BmRdOCzGACptmX8m33kQ2NmvdCrkff8UQj8DJXRbVx/HOErSq GPTMoFfmQ4LQas69zeWoWQNhrlB/+nAfnx9Q9JN5iGx4lXmMgzF96T56KfHxbAdGZbQr b+uQdlK8zgThao1RqQcjXyUeMxEdgRNLshPtDeOzlKkP2yiI6ZwVDlXRS9EiwH3IoVD3 /VRz2PWCBEIYO+m3xQbhCuV/4dH0NjU/ZjVEkncE+CtbRVYJBYW0Vik7lKZTRpVgSpys rJGw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533m5Rmo+O3mUtfs9VBtH2AQ3tvOKEcrj/MhTD+dPXUHWtu9+zi2 tCGbuy4PJnAyophhb3kl/HTJlP7BBwr99Q==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz0pkUMWsqpEyu8hpb+ENzus/u5begeq6nP9Fz00mR5D5FdPcr8RV48AI9geq1q71m9OmInTw==
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6a00:1a46:b029:1d5:9acd:798c with SMTP id h6-20020a056a001a46b02901d59acd798cmr5116626pfv.25.1614885461724; Thu, 04 Mar 2021 11:17:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mike-mac.lan (107-182-37-239.volcanocom.com. [107.182.37.239]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 3sm51220pjk.26.2021.03.04.11.17.40 for <ietf@ietf.org> (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 04 Mar 2021 11:17:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: What ASN.1 got right
To: ietf@ietf.org
References: <20210302010731.GL30153@localhost> <0632b948-9ed1-f2bd-96da-9922ebb2aa60@mtcc.com> <YECpybvczdbKHvHx@puck.nether.net> <CAMm+LwiiySi5O1_WDc4-F9x1XfMFFvE-rEbc4uw+31DHJNEHEA@mail.gmail.com> <86b382d8-dd3c-ed0a-8dde-f0837cf10e98@mtcc.com> <21f4daa7-fe35-3d85-a7ff-b547cfe55ff7@network-heretics.com> <b542f10e-c9ec-f08e-b023-dca4f518fcc0@mtcc.com> <b3605b00-8797-b714-7bc9-82ab488b40bf@network-heretics.com>
From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
Message-ID: <9444a9d3-837b-8ff3-2f91-4407c496d851@mtcc.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2021 11:17:39 -0800
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.8.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <b3605b00-8797-b714-7bc9-82ab488b40bf@network-heretics.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------6AD9279BAA879030F3161E73"
Content-Language: en-US
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/B64YSqbGov54RyULr9yzXJSNGM8>
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 19:17:44 -0000

On 3/4/21 11:03 AM, Keith Moore wrote:
>
>
> On 3/4/21 1:56 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>> It's silly to dismiss those as if they didn't exist or weren't 
>>> important. They're quite often parts of critical infrastructure.
>>>
>>
>> Online != Internet connected. If you're using TLS you are online 
>> definitionally. You may be on a stub air-gapped network but you're 
>> still using internet protocols to communicate. That stub network can 
>> have all it needs to support its infrastructure. It's just as online 
>> as anything else.
>
> Usually, "all it needs to support its infrastructure" is an Ethernet 
> switch or WiFi access point.   DNS is often considered an operational 
> hazard in such environments, sometimes DHCP is also, as is firmware 
> update.
>
>> X.509 comes from a time where you couldn't even make that assumption. 
>> Applications that require that assumption are pretty far and few 
>> between these days.
>
> I don't think it makes sense to waste otherwise good protocol 
> engineering just because it doesn't fit someone's idea of "how the 
> network works".   TLS can be profiled to work well in such 
> environments (without change to the TLS stack), and so can X.509.  Why 
> re-invent the wheels?
>
>
My point here isn't to defend how TLS works, it's to say that almost 
nothing requires the truly offline verification aspect that x.509 brings 
to the table. I can (and have) built a asymmetric key login mechanism 
that just puts naked public keys into a user table of a database, for 
example. The x.509-first view of the asymmetric keys world has confused 
a lot of thinking and had I introduced it to that mechanism it would 
have worlds more complex and much harder to understand. Designers 
should, dare I say it, be looking at the actual requirements of the 
system before settling on a particular solution.

Mike