Re: The IETF environment

S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Mon, 28 April 2014 14:50 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 07:45:25 -0700
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
Subject: Re: The IETF environment
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Hi Phillip,
At 10:28 26-04-2014, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>There is really no precedent for discovering that a rogue agency was
>conspiring to sabotage efforts to provide Internet security.

The IETF have been considering security in its protocols for the last 
11 years.  It has also been considering cryptography for use on the 
Internet.  About a year ago it was found that all does not provide 
the security one would expect.  There hasn't been such a 
precedent.  Perpass is an unusual occurrence.

The comments on the thread describe the IETF environment as "people 
coming together
to work on stuff" whereas people from the outside consider the IETF 
as more than that.  The question which has not been discussed is 
whether the IETF accepts the responsibility for all aspects of its 
protocols.  If the answer to that question is "yes" it would be up to 
the IESG to figure out how to solve the problem(s) in a timely manner.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy