Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Mon, 08 June 2020 18:23 UTC

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Subject: Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating
To: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 11:23:09 -0700
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On 6/8/20 11:12 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> ssl, then later tls, took hold because it was designed for, and 
> therefore easily applied to tcp sessions and because there was a lot 
> of effort put into creating ancillary frameworks, e.g. the pki, 
> sensible APIs, etc.  This push towards application usability made it 
> transparent to the protocol consumer, whether that be granny, or 14yo 
> whizz-kid, or someone trying to do some online shopping.
>
> Obviously you're technically correct that an app can call any library 
> function and that it matters little to a CPU or the data, or the 
> network layer whether it's rsa, aes or sha - or ipsec, or tls or 
> whatever.  But the success of tls came down to usability, or more 
> specifically use-transparency: security could be implemented without 
> people even being aware of it and shifting people from unencrypted to 
> encrypted data transfer was a easy as configuring a server-side 
> redirect.  Conversely configuring and managing ipsec still creates 
> thundering headaches even for experienced operators.

ssl had the advantage that it 1) beat ipsec to market, and 2) wasn't 
subject to API differences from OS layer calls like IPsec was, and with 
quite a bit of churn as i recall too. it's really too bad, imo. we 
wouldn't have had to do the contortions of dtls, for example. and now 
there's this problem. none of them are earth shattering, but it would 
have been cleaner.


Mike