Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Sun, 11 April 2021 22:20 UTC

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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 23:20:30 +0100
Message-ID: <CABrd9SQ9_MD9chWF_24Ntg=Q=gdtmdtzQq0Vu=XS0_CT2Y1U3A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
To: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
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On Sun, 11 Apr 2021 at 16:42, Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:

>
> On 4/11/21 7:34 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, 10 Apr 2021 at 18:04, Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 4/10/21 2:29 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, 10 Apr 2021 at 00:35, Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 4/9/21 4:26 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>>
>>> It is only a 'three packet handshake' if you ignore the off path
>>> interactions with the DNS service. The timeout on DNS tens to be rather
>>> smaller than that most would be comfortable with for crypto.
>>>
>>> I don't see why it can't be long lived, but even normal TTL's would get
>>> amortized over a lot of connections. Right now with certs it is a 5 message
>>> affair which cannot get better. But that is why one of $BROWSERVENDORS
>>> doing an experiment would be helpful.
>>>
>>
>> When I was designing Certificate Transparency, Chrome ruled out any side
>> channel communications requirement during handshake. Given that DNS is
>> required anyway, perhaps this would be different. However, the other
>> problem is introducing DNS as a trust root - the DNS hierarchy is
>> considerably less secure than CAs were even before CT but now it's really a
>> very poor option in comparison.
>>
>> Could be fixed with DNS Transparency, of course.
>>
>>
>> DNS is the natural trust anchor for the internet. And I don't know what
>> "considerably less secure" means. If you mean that DNSSec is broken, then
>> you should say that. If you mean that DNSsec deployment is thin, that is
>> quite another thing, and that is all about the incentives to deploy. I
>> don't consider a plethora of CA's of varying security responsibility to be
>> a feature and in fact is a bug.
>>
> What I mean is that the authorities for DNS get compromised far more often
> than CAs do. Also, DNS has the same plethora of authorities with varying
> security responsibility.
>
> Huh? Source?
>
I am sorry that my source is not verifiable (see "transparency is a good
thing"). My experience is that certificates have been seriously compromised
at least an order of magnitude less often than domains.

On "plethora of authorities" that is obvious from inspection.