Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> Fri, 06 September 2013 03:30 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 19:30:53 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA
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Cc: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>, "ietf@ietf.org Discussion" <ietf@ietf.org>
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On 9/5/13 7:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> I'm not talking about what implementors and operators and users
> should be doing; still less about what legislators should or
> shouldn't be doing. I care about all those things, but the question
> here is what standards or informational outputs from the IETF are
> needed, in addition to what's already done or in the works.

There are pretty clearly still some serious problems around
crypto and usability.  I tend to look at those problems as
largely being implementation questions.  But still, it may
be the case that there's work that can be done to protect
leaking what might be called signaling (or metadata).

This assumes, of course, that current crypto technology
(ciphers, anyway) is sufficient, which Schneier seems to
think is the case.

Melinda