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Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Fri, 22 August 2014 19:45 UTC

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Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 15:45:17 -0400
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment
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I concur with Viktor's reply. I even like his metaphor :-).

OSteve
> On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 05:25:17AM +0000, l.wood@surrey.ac.uk wrote:
>
>> Okay, so with opportunistic security, all a man in the middle
>> has to do is block any communications he can't decrypt, and it
>> automatically downgrades to select something he can break?
> And without OS, he need not do anything at all, because the vast
> majority of the traffic is cleartext.  However OS can support
> downgrade resistant modes of operation, given appropriately secure
> out-of-band signalling, (possibly DANE/DNSSEC).
>
> OS is not an effort to displace already working authenticated
> encrypted traffic.  Rather, it is an effort to upgrade currently
> unencrypted traffic to encryption or currently unauthenticated
> traffic to authentication.
>
> Hence, "Opportunistic TLS" with SMTP for the former, and "Opportunistic
> DANE TLS" with the latter.
>
> You can point fingers at the shabby clothing of the OS emperor,
> but at least he's not naked.
>
> --
> 	Viktor.

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