Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com> Fri, 06 September 2013 22:03 UTC

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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1309051743130.47262@hiroshima.bogus.com> <52293197.1060809@gmail.com> <5C7FECAB-8A22-4AF1-B023-456458E1B288@nominum.com> <522949C2.8010206@gmail.com> <52294C6D.7090206@gmail.com> <m2ppsmzgs5.wl%randy@psg.com> <5229686A.5090308@gmail.com> <31078634-5AEA-4FC9-80A8-2E77650BA530@piuha.net> <20130906072539.GJ5700@besserwisser.org> <9AC2A86F-250C-4B3C-B9BA-8DF44C937B41@nominum.com> <20130906210638.GC3428@besserwisser.org> <158C3418-AE87-4843-BFD5-3E2AC3495631@virtualized.org>
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 15:02:51 -0700
Message-ID: <CAHBU6itwDc8DiY4B_2GGe0xWZ3Zs_ctx3BkKkzdGTZT2PfgMkA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA
From: Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>
To: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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Cc: Måns Nilsson <mansaxel@besserwisser.org>, "ietf@ietf.org list" <ietf@ietf.org>
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How about a BCP saying conforming implementations of a wide-variety of
security-area RFCs MUST be open-source?

*ducks*


On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 2:34 PM, David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> wrote:

> On Sep 6, 2013, at 2:06 PM, Måns Nilsson <mansaxel@besserwisser.org>
> wrote:
> >> Right, because there's no way the NSA could ever pwn the DNS root key.
> > It is probably easier for NSA or similar agencies in other countries
> > to coerce X.509 root CA providers that operate on a competetive market
> > than fooling the entire international DNS black helicopter cabal.
>
> Probably the wrong place to apply the paranoia. How much do you trust the
> AEP Keyper HSM tamperproof blackbox hasn't had a backdoor installed into it
> at the factory?
>
> > Audit and open source seem to be good starting points.
>
> Where feasible, sure. Unfortunately, the rabbit hole is deep.  How many
> billions of transistors are there in commodity chips these days?
>
> Regards,
> -drc
>
>