Re: More haste, less speed.

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 06 March 2017 21:30 UTC

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Subject: Re: More haste, less speed.
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2017 16:30:30 -0500
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> On Mar 6, 2017, at 3:12 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
> 
> ​Again, you are mistaken.​

I think you meant to say, that you disagree, at least in general, but that your
experience in the SMTP space is more limited, so I might be right in the SMTP case.

> ​Security Policy can benefit from DNSSEC but it absolutely does not require DNSSEC
> to provide value.

This is not true for SMTP, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks if the security
policy is not made tamper-resistant.

> Since the current Internet security policy is to require no security, any policy
> publication mechanism adds value over the baseline.

Yes, against passive attacks, but STARTTLS is already sufficient for that.

-- 
	Viktor.