RE: Last Call: <draft-hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion-05.txt> (Design considerations for Metadata Insertion) to Informational RFC

[<[e-mail]>]

Hi Ted,

Thank you for the reply and for implementing these changes.

I checked the diff, but I’m afraid the -06 version has the same issues as the ones I reported in January 31.

I’m reiterating that most of my comments are still unaddressed in -06.

Cheers,
Med

De : Ted Hardie [mailto:[e-mail]]
Envoyé : mercredi 22 février 2017 23:09
À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN
Cc : [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Objet : Re: Last Call: <draft-hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion-05.txt> (Design considerations for Metadata Insertion) to Informational RFC

Hi Mohamed,
Thanks for your review.  I've uploaded a draft -06 with updates from your and other reviews.  Some notes in-line.

On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 1:49 AM, <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Dear Ted,

Please find below my general review of the document and also my detailed comments.

* Overall:
- I don't think the document is ready to be published as it is. It does not discuss the usability and implications of the advice. Further, it may be interpreted that a client/end system/user can always by itself populate data that is supplied by on-path nodes (in current deployments). That's assumption is not true for some protocols.
- The purpose of publishing this advice is not clear. For example, how this advice will be implemented in practice? What is its scope?
- I would personally prefer an updated version of RFC7258 with more strict language on the privacy-related considerations. This is more actionable with concrete effects in documents that will required to include a discussion on privacy related matters.

Detailed comments are provided below:

* The abstract says the following:

   The IAB has published [RFC7624] in response to several revelations of
   pervasive attack on Internet communications.  This document considers
   the implications of protocol designs which associate metadata with
   encrypted flows.  In particular, it asserts that designs which do so
   by explicit actions of the end system are preferable to designs in
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   which middleboxes insert them.

I suggest you explicit what is meant by "the end system".

I have updated this to clarify that this is the host/end system not the user.

If you mean the owner/user, then the text should say so. If you mean a client software instance, then bugs/inappropriate default values may lead to (privacy leak) surprises too. It was reported in the past that some browsers inject the MSISDN too.

* Introduction: "To ensure that the Internet can be trusted by users"

Rather « To minimize the risk of Internet-originated attacks targeted at users ».

I've adopted this language.

It's reasonable to claim the Internet can be trusted by users; see how the usage of social networks has become severely twisted for example

I've also considered your point that an updated version of RFC7258 might be a better outlet for advice like this. We did consider several approaches, including incorporating the text in an update to  RFC 3552 or as part of a document describing the full set of companion mitigations to the threats in RFC 7624 (draft-iab-privsec-confidentiality-mitigations would be one approach).  Those are all valid approaches, but it seemed that short, easily read documents tackling a single point might be easier to produce and consume.
Thanks again for your review,
Ted Hardie