Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 22 August 2014 12:13 UTC
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Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 13:13:16 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>, "dcrocker@bbiw.net" <dcrocker@bbiw.net>
Subject: Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
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Hi Christian, On 21/08/14 20:23, Christian Huitema wrote: > Viktor's draft is basically fine. It is short and clear. The various > rounds of edits tend to make it "different," but not better. IMHO, it > is time to ship it. I think your mail is a good summary though perhaps it doesn't catch all of the concerns that Dave expressed. In particular he also had a concern that we may be addressing the wrong target audience. However, there was no significant discussion of that when I kicked off a thread so I conclude that others don't share that concern. All that said, I agree with your conclusion that we risk going more sideways than forward with additional iteration. Right now, Viktor is preparing a -04 taking into account list discussion on -03 and the substantial editorial inputs from Steve Kent and Ben Kaduk. Barring late surprises, my plan is to put that into IESG evaluation as I conclude we have reached rough consensus on the concepts here. For who are those interested, I plan to add the saag list to the cc for IESG evaluation comments/discuss points so you'll be able to follow along there as the IESG consider this draft. That'll probably happen in the run up to the Sep 4th IESG telechat, or maybe the one on Sept 18th, depending. And lastly, thanks to everyone for the engaging discussion. Cheers, S. > > -- Christian Huitema > > > >
- Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Paul Wouters
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Dave Crocker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Scott Kitterman
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Christian Huitema
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Paul Wouters
- Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Theodore Ts'o
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Michael StJohns
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Dave Crocker
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Mark Andrews
- Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (w… Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Ted Hardie
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Hosnieh Rafiee
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Nico Williams
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger