Re: Update on feedback on US-based meetings, and IETF 102

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Fri, 14 April 2017 17:31 UTC

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Subject: Re: Update on feedback on US-based meetings, and IETF 102
To: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
References: <149204035801.15694.8437554373033456064.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <16010f27-e86b-b17d-4a13-62645e0bdc89@cs.tcd.ie> <3DF53F6ACE338CACF247F910@PSB>
Cc: iaoc@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2017 19:31:38 +0200
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Hi John,


On 4/13/17 8:35 PM, John C Klensin wrote:

> (1) We are living in very unstable times in which reliable
> predictions of the long-term future, or even the future for the
> 3 to 5 years out that the IAOC thinks the community has told it
> to plan meetings, is even more difficult than usual. There are
> strong reasons, connected to our traditional criteria such as
> locations near where concentrations of the participants live and
> appropriate facilities, for meeting in the US, and we should
> avoid meeting in the US only if the circumstances and logic make
> sense.

The same holds true for other regions.

>
> (2) I don't believe in canceling, or refusing to hold, meetings
> in a particular location to make a political point or to punish
> a government that we see as behaving badly, if only for the
> purely pragmatic reason that few governments are likely to pay
> any attention at all to where we do or do not hold meetings.
> Certainly the US is not one of the exceptions.   However, if we
> do make decisions on that basis --and some of the on-list
> comments have sounded very much like that-- then we'd better be
> ready to schedule meetings for those countries, on
> shorter-than-usual notice if necessary, to reward them if the
> policies are changed.

I largely agree with you on this point.  The basis of whether to hold a
meeting is whether the organizers believe that the objectives of the
IETF can be achieved.  If as individuals a great many of us make known
that we would refuse to attend a meeting because of the locale, then the
likelihood of holding a successful meeting is diminished.  Thus, we
don't really require additional rules in this regard.

>
> (3) Circumstances change.  Not just political circumstances (who
> would have predicted a year ago that the US would be in its
> present state now?), but there is always a risk of hotel or
> neighborhood remodeling or construction and natural and
> human-made disasters that could severely impede a meeting or
> attendance at it.  It seems to me to be very important that we
> think through the circumstances under which we would pull the
> plug on a venue on short notice -- whether to try to find a
> different location or to go largely or entirely remote -- and,
> as others suggested during the mtgvenue session, that we keep
> that set of discussions rather separate from how we do
> longer-term meeting planning.

I think that's a worthy discussion, but as editor of that doc, my plea
is that we not get bogged down in it just yet.

>
> (4) I have no idea how to predict likely US policies toward
> visitors (or residents traveling outside the country and trying
> to return) six months out, much less three to five years in the
> future.  The government's sudden policy reversals in several
> other areas in the last two weeks should add to everyone's
> uncertainty, as should the possibility that the courts will
> continue to block obnoxious policies and punish those who
> profile and harass selected visitors.   The threats to require
> passwords, inspection of phones, and similar nonsense of people
> who are now covered by visa waivers may turn out to be a real
> issues or as hollow as promises to brand China a currency
> manipulator turned into during the last 48 hours or so.

These aren't mere threats.  The CPB *already* does require *some* people
to unlock their devices.  As inconvenient as that might be (a) it is not
new, and (b) it is by no means unique to the United States.
>
> Equally important, it is impossible to predict British policies
> as Brexit evolves nor what other countries might do in
> retaliation or response to those policies, US actions, etc.
> Given other forces in the world, I think it would be unwise to
> place large bets on the Schengen agreements being unchanged
> three or five years from now, especially where holders of non-EU
> passports are concerned.  Similar issues apply in Asia: for
> example, I hope that we won't see sufficient destabilization on
> the Korean Peninsula to make a meeting in Seoul or even Busan
> inadvisable, but, if the macho chest-pounding, posturing, and
> implicit threats by assorted crazy-spectrum people continues,
> one never knows.   I think it is pretty safe to suggest that it
> would be unwise to plan a meeting for Damascus or Aleppo three
> years from now, but no one has seriously proposed either city.  
>
> However, within sensible limits (with the two Syrian examples
> mentioned as examples of non-sensible cases), I'm opposed to
> making _any_ changes in our long-term meeting plans based on
> rapidly changing political considerations, including but not
> limited to events in the US or UK in the last year.  Again, I
> think it is important to monitor things as meetings get close
> and to have some community consensus about the circumstances
> under which we would make significant changes in meeting plans,
> but deciding to hold (or not hold) a meeting in the US based on
> fears or fantasies about what has happened in the last six
> months (or overconfidence about how those things will play 9ut)
> and where those things might lead makes no sense to me.

Stability is an important aspect, when considering all of this.  It also
seems to be diminishing commodity.

The IAOC can only work on the information they have at the time that
they make decisions.  At THIS time, people are being refused visas and
being turned away at the border in a nearly indiscriminate fashion. 
Maybe not a lot, but perhaps enough (where "enough" is going to be in
the eye of the beholder).  While it is true that the situation could
calm down in the next few months or years, that is NOT the information
we have at THIS time.  At the end of the day, the IAOC must make an
assessment as to whether or not they are likely to hold a successful
meeting in the U.S. in several years' time.  If they judge that the
meeting would exclude a good number of people, where in, say, Canada the
refusals would be lower, why wouldn't we hold the meeting in Canada
instead (not that Canada is perfect)?

Eliot