Re: ietf.org end-to-end principle

[Stefan Winter <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

> The takeaway for me from this thread is problems with CAPTCHA’s, some situations where CAPTCHA’s don’t even appear, the tuning of various filters, and possible additional mirrors. I have asked the IETF tools and IT folks to take a look. This isn’t the only thing they are doing, so it will probably take some time to figure out what we can do. And they still must be able to deal with denial of service attacks from all over the Internet and not just Tor, and yes, the tools at our disposal will be imperfect, and yes, there will be some pain for some users as a result. They will do their best. Don’t expect miracles.

The takeaway for me is that the end-to-end principle is dead. The times
where all intelligence should be in end hosts only, no middleboxes, and
KISS have gone, and techniques going in the opposite direction are not
only in use, but even embraced by IETF operations.

We are discussing only how to tweak middleboxes to be better; rather
than discussing how best to get rid of middleboxes.

I believe this is actually a bad thing in a wider view: the IETF
advocates the use of encryption everywhere; and at the same time we see
that those wonderful middleboxes have a problem with encryption and
generate MITM like situations. Yet, we continue to use them.

There's a bit of a contradiction in here.

Greetings,

Stefan Winter

> I would also like to ask that we not dwell deeply on the goodness or not of Tor or any other networks or systems for that matter. We’re not here to pass judgment, but of course we try to enable access to IETF resources as widely as we can.
> 
> Jari
> 


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