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Re: ietf.org unaccessible for Tor users

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 15 March 2016 11:39 UTC

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Subject: Re: ietf.org unaccessible for Tor users
To: cdel@firsthand.net, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
References: <20160313143521.GC26841@Hirasawa> <m2a8m0y72q.wl%randy@psg.com> <F04B3B85-6B14-43BA-9A21-FC0A31E79065@piuha.net> <56E7E09D.7040100@cisco.com> <56E7E16C.4050803@firsthand.net> <56E7E327.2090803@cisco.com> <56E7F273.4030708@firsthand.net> <56E7F352.8050506@firsthand.net>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 11:39:28 +0000
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Cc: Yui Hirasawa <yui@cock.li>, IETF Disgust List <ietf@ietf.org>
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On 15/03/16 11:34, Christian de Larrinaga wrote:
> The question is does IETF need that policeman to do that filtering? Is
> it desirable? I don't get the sense that it is.

I believe there have been attacks in the past that had they
been at larger scale could have taken the IETF site offline.
CF are a mitigation for that. I think some such mitigation
is sadly necessary. But I also think we want that to work
better, to not track folks and to not get in the way of access,
unless taking such actions is really necessary. (I don't think
it is myself, at least not in the normal course of events, but
then I don't see the operations stuff.)

Cheers,
S.

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