IETF88 Technical Plenary hums

Russ Housley <> Wed, 06 November 2013 20:42 UTC

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Subject: IETF88 Technical Plenary hums
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At the end of the IETF88 Technical Plenary, there were five hums.  This note is to provide the text of the hums and the community response.  The people in the room were asked to hum for YES if they agreed with the statement and hum for NO if they disagreed with the statement.

1.  The IETF is willing to respond to the pervasive surveillance attack?

    Overwhelming YES.  Silence for NO.

2. Pervasive surveillance is an attack, and the IETF needs to adjust our threat model to consider it when developing standards track specifications.

    Very strong YES.  Silence for NO.

3. The IETF should include encryption, even outside authentication, where practical.

    Strong YES.  Silence for NO.

4.  The IETF should strive for end-to-end encryption, even when there are middleboxes in the path.

    Mixed response, but more YES than NO.

5.  Many insecure protocols are used in the Internet today, and the IETF should create a secure alternative for the popular ones.

    Mostly YES, but some NO.