Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality

Andrew McConachie <andrew@depht.com> Tue, 13 April 2021 08:46 UTC

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From: "Andrew McConachie" <andrew@depht.com>
To: "Nico Williams" <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: "Michael Thomas" <mike@mtcc.com>, ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 10:46:24 +0200
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On 13 Apr 2021, at 0:27, Nico Williams wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 03:17:32PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>> (1) may have been because of (2), and I believe (2) was because of
>>> internal technical and political issues.  I.e., I would not consider 
>>> it
>>> dispositive that Google seemed to like DANE then gave up on it, 
>>> though
>>> that and why they did certainly is germane.
>>
>> Yes, that's what I would assume as well. Build it and they will come 
>> has a
>> sterling track record of failure in IETF.
>
> Building a technical spec is not enough, indeed.  DANE hasn't 
> succeeded
> yet, and neither has DNSSEC.  But DANE is starting to gather steam (in
> no small part due to Viktor's efforts) in the realm of SMTP.  The fact
> that DANE was early for its time doesn't mean that the single root and
> unyielding name constraints aren't appealing or appealing enough to 
> make
> a more serious try now.
>
> As noted, the tooling for DNSSEC has been substantially improved in
> recent years.  Implementations of DANE do exist now.  There are a 
> number
> of missing elements, such as a TLS extension to staple DANE that
> supports authenticated denial of existence.  We're making progress
> though.  It may seem slow, but there may be a preference cascade at 
> some
> point.  It may only take enough user-agent, and registrar / domain
> hosting services to provide this functionality to make it popular.

There’s been too much focus on getting browsers to implement 
HTTPS/DANE. These days HTTPS is used for all kinds of stuff that has 
nothing to do with the web. Take the Fediverse for example. ActivityPub 
uses HTTPS for server-server communication in a manner similar to how 
MTAs use SMTP. There are plenty of other examples.

My point is that if people want to see HTTPS/DANE deployments grow they 
should start hacking HTTPS/DANE validation into the numerous open source 
projects that act as HTTPS clients. Find communities of geeks to act as 
early adopters, and simply ignore the politics of large browser vendors 
as they’re obviously a lost cause.

—Andrew