Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Sun, 11 April 2021 14:40 UTC

Return-Path: <benl@google.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2AEEA3A0D81 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 07:40:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -17.598
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH=-0.5, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cgvy40QsnJVw for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 07:40:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-vs1-xe2d.google.com (mail-vs1-xe2d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::e2d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6117C3A0D6B for <ietf@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 07:40:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-vs1-xe2d.google.com with SMTP id 2so5354737vsh.4 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 07:40:10 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=FIO74eFHFafMSz26zM7RgWjmMah1CGAyUL0PJj935kU=; b=KXIUDnD/DmIDHfJYkFdsr0SAmlueejNUfO0ljIJmqVZL1RFcfkgtzmVIEdOnu2w0Yl 2UgW9dgVodHKN2BoRwbhgCaWFR1yfXFSMoi6Kb7wiQTpU4NXK9SGvUl7xQ018z4UxubX xr1ihx/JRQsunS0jLNGoX2rtff2o/1skQhqzfqWb9h9taaY5mAc3n7Pb/eQ/1cfFtc95 D9ST+K5FJYznKOJmsg4dEnPxO/7EQhsPySpXEjVt/wr9Jyy4NUdPwC/A52ZI+6lIDwqL uDCMroIDKkAmUmTLKulV9tuBVer9LZTkFSjvYqpsqd9g0/MPSTEWg9uRVJUw+xANhpmZ NFpg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=FIO74eFHFafMSz26zM7RgWjmMah1CGAyUL0PJj935kU=; b=XzoueS7ZdH/XMpPp1FUIQnlbyTKDuh755DEfW5WVk0OhfuxFAgGATbsY2TbTajXdXH 5FBVV8Xyr8azqXdgoMf73vtOXIb7H8EPaBvwFZhdqvZ5dSeCR0RyIsNMG3evgTko3oBu TpaGd1lDdrMUHxok4/JF0UEGBu75tAHmazJTWlitbIkrryisd3mI6ozmpyHIUNWLoMBQ 0ndVPiHklbnv6qT9njWwtJ0hjMOMVRS15K4t2KN1dOWGuy6yvc4rv5JYfLKJpp/OVP9+ 0JkChF3tsLjLAHMIEf1I8sI3768dFp02ReBY0DOB55JZktDFxB/htvpSCHubAhDqFPXk Jffw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530/GrZ52xC3vNDZS4VHqowXk0Pz5lgXCcH+m9Jwv+C83ccQHDZc p0UV2V+9/fH4/L379Fd5lyWc2TnS9iAJDBTIX42bAA==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwTXHuyd+rvFRWzL9WjOOdgiJ0pV7NZWzKJQ/RdsXDBB3cHDn4w3d63CkA3SzQfJF/1iZBFE3tW02JyDi2CWcY=
X-Received: by 2002:a67:b81:: with SMTP id 123mr17029869vsl.52.1618152008425; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 07:40:08 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <3b25c77d-e721-e86d-6c34-a90039aab0e2@mtcc.com> <CAMm+Lwhi8xwFgZJL7jod2g4urZt_f+dm0tNi+3y1osqOfch2mQ@mail.gmail.com> <3593a01f-73f4-7d03-a85b-dff64a8b070e@mtcc.com> <CABrd9STZXonBDvWB7Z36H2mD20Juubc01TUmEvpfWkvJggQVOQ@mail.gmail.com> <20210410175712.GF9612@localhost> <926C5F27-E011-4809-88DB-DBC9A8976D01@dukhovni.org> <20210410195048.GG9612@localhost> <bfdceabb-143b-a0ab-3041-05888e8f39f2@mtcc.com> <20210410203934.GH9612@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <20210410203934.GH9612@localhost>
From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 15:39:56 +0100
Message-ID: <CABrd9SQzf=RO743qYOVz3NOHQ=G0d8aWuvOsKa8VOsniu37Hhw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>, IETF Discussion List <ietf@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000a7fc7205bfb35f42"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/M3zon7uMasQfE2E_RahV2aNRH_U>
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 14:40:30 -0000

On Sat, 10 Apr 2021 at 21:40, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Sat, Apr 10, 2021 at 12:59:34PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
> > Let me ask a pointed question: if we used DANE+DNSSec do we have
> confidence
> > in the security of the solution? I think we'd have to have a lot of
> > confidence in both that they are really ready for prime time.
>
> I do, for the reasons I gave.  It can't be worse than WebPKI, that's for
> sure.


It is not for sure, because DNS has no transparency requirements.


>   At least in a pre-post-quantum world.  In a PQ world I suspect
> we'd want to have something more akin to a PKI + Needham-Schroeder to
> optimize PQ PK.
>
> I think I would prefer a single-root PKIX PKI with name constraints to
> DNSSEC/DANE.  Perhaps we can still get that by getting registries/
> registrars to operate name-constrained CAs, and replace WebPKI with a
> DNS-parallel PKI.  But at this point DNSSEC/DANE seems much more
> realistic as a way to get to a single-root name constrained PKI for
> domainnames.  Also, DNSSEC can do secure denial of existence while PKIX
> cannot because wheras DNSSEC is based on a directory (DNS), x.509/PKIX,
> though it was meant to be used with directories (DAP) doesn't really
> have a viable global directory scheme (imagine using LDAP as we use
> DNS!), and doesn't have a directory that can do secure denial of
> existence either.
>
> Nico
> --
>
>