Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)

Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> Fri, 26 February 2010 21:16 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2010 16:18:50 -0500
Message-ID: <a123a5d61002261318x5654245ch5f370ce7d9b8854e@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, IETF Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>
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Once you have established an SSH relationship the protocol allows you
to determine with a high degree of confidence that you are connecting
to the same end point in future.

That is not a perfect security control but it is a very useful one. It
is a much more useful control than any provided by infrastructure that
is not deployed.

On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 3:58 AM, Masataka Ohta
<mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote:
> Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> SSH is not a bad security protocol. It provides a very high level of
>> protection against high probability risks with little or no impact on
>> the user. There is a narrow window of vulnerability to a man in the
>> middle attack.
>
> As a security researcher, I can teach you that the security you
> observe is not of SSH but of return routability.
>
> Return routability over many third party ISPs is not 'verifiable',
> of course.
>
>                                                        Masataka Ohta
>
>
>



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