Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks) to Proposed Standard

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Sat, 10 January 2015 19:31 UTC

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Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2015 14:31:16 -0500 (EST)
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks) to Proposed Standard
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----- Original Message -----
> 
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
> (tls) to consider the following document:
> - 'TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing
>    Protocol Downgrade Attacks'
>   <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-01-23. Exceptionally, comments may be
> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>    This document defines a Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) that
>    prevents protocol downgrade attacks on the Transport Layer Security
>    (TLS) protocol.  It updates RFC 2246, RFC 4346, and RFC 5246.

The "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite" fix cannot be a proposed standard. 
The mechanism it fixes (the browser's special downgrade of TLS) is not an IETF
protocol, nor related to the TLS WG. Making this a proposed standard, would 
imply that the flawed technique is into standards track. I believe that this 
text should be informational.

regards,
Nikos