Re: mail signing history, was Call for Community Feedback: Retiring IETF FTP Service

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 18 November 2020 22:05 UTC

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Subject: Re: mail signing history, was Call for Community Feedback: Retiring IETF FTP Service
To: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>, ietf@ietf.org
References: <01RS5CFAY5S0005PTU@mauve.mrochek.com> <20201118211937.01A22278DC6F@ary.qy> <01RS5Q2L2D6Y005PTU@mauve.mrochek.com> <5239b5-3d2-4079-5f5d-f4a2e0c5552@taugh.com> <c9c6d83e-cf79-262e-ae0e-361050026912@mtcc.com>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 22:04:57 +0000
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Hiya,

On 18/11/2020 21:51, Michael Thomas wrote:
> 
> On 11/18/20 1:45 PM, John R Levine wrote:
>> On Wed, 18 Nov 2020, Ned Freed wrote:
>>> That said, a mechanism for publishing/expiring DKIM private keys is 
>>> something
>>> the IETF might want to standardize.
>>
>> I've started to publish my old private keys since I rotate every month 
>> but I agree a standard way to tell people where to look would be nice.
>>
> Why isn't just deleting/replacing the selector sufficient? It's not as 
> definitive but it's a lot simpler.

Publishing the private key enables various forms of
denyability - if someone claims msg1 is original
anyone with access to the private can produce a
msg2 that seems as cryptographically correct but
is clearly bogus (e.g. containing lottery numbers
that post-date message timestamps).

Yes an adversary could have gotten an independent
signed timestamp on msg1 before the private was
published but that seems low probability.

I'd support development of such a standard if it
had a good chance of deployment as I think it'd
also encourage key rotation.

S.

> 
> Mike
>