Re: Security Considerations, IoT and Everything

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 22 November 2016 21:20 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 16:20:14 -0500
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Subject: Re: Security Considerations, IoT and Everything
To: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
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Hi,

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 3:25 PM, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
wrote:

> Hi  -
>
> During the plenary presentations in Seoul we were treated to a view of how
> the Internet has changed with the introduction of cheap network-connected
> devices with poor security.  That presentation, as well as discussion in
> various IoT/Constrained Devices related working groups got me thinking
> about RFC security considerations and how they may need to change in the
> future. Basically, we've been writing Security Consideration sections that
> address threats *to* the protocol and devices that implement the protocol.
> Is it time to revise BCP72/RFC3522 to require we also address threats
> *from* the protocols to the Internet as a whole?
>
> For example, DNS has been used quite frequently as a stepping-off point
> for DDoS attacks.  In the recent IOT related attacks, bad UI/Password
> management choices were a contributing factor to those IoT devices being
> used in DDoS.    In https://www.engadget.com/2016/
> 11/03/hackers-hijack-a-philips-hue-lights-with-a-drone/, the researchers
> were able to take advantages of bad crytographic design choices (e.g. all
> of the firmware was signed/verified using the same secret key - which was
> present in all lightbulbs), and a flaw in the Zigbee attack, and a drone
> (to get close enough) to take control of a group of HUE lightbulbs,
> re-write their firmware and flash SOS.
>
> One of the claims for IoT is 10s of billions of devices added to the
> internet within the next 5-10 years, and that may be a low estimate.  The
> targets for IoT are everywhere from simple sensor/controller/actuator
> devices (e.g. thermostats, lighting systems) to more complex combinations
> of devices at all grades of capability from ultra cheap throwaways to
> consumer/commercial/industrial.  Then there's the how cyber-physical
> thing - internet connected devices that can interact and control things in
> the real world. Consider for a moment the threat to safety and health if
> the HUE were instead designed to be used for UV sterilization instead of
> plain lighting.
>
> There's also this push for cheap and fast to market. Unfortunately, that
> may mean poorly protected devices with unintended consequences to the
> Internet as a whole.  We're starting to see worked examples of this.
>
> So getting back to RFC3522:
>
> 1) Is it time to update this 2003 document in view of current threats?
>
> 2) Can we say anything useful with respect to security protocol design,
> protocol fields of use and probable impact on the Internet?
>
> 3) Should we set a minimum bar to try and avoid standardizing unsafe
> protocols or at least unsafe security choices in protocols?
>
>
> In the early days of the internet, connected devices were mostly big iron
> - main frames and mini-computers.  Next came the wave of PCs.  Next the
> smart phones and tablets.  All of these had one thing mostly in common -
> there was generally a Human in the loop somewhere watching the device.  For
> IoT - humans not so much. That's obviously both an advantage and
> disadvantage; but it might also be an indication that we need to re-think
> our internet security strategies - again.
>
>
In addition, we are already in process of updating RFC3552, security
considerations and are looking for feedback on the SAAG list.

Thanks.

>
> Mike
>
>
>


-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen