Re: Security for various IETF services

"Fred Baker (fred)" <fred@cisco.com> Thu, 03 April 2014 23:40 UTC

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From: "Fred Baker (fred)" <fred@cisco.com>
To: Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: Security for various IETF services
Thread-Topic: Security for various IETF services
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Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 23:40:00 +0000
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In view of recent issues in TurkTelecom and Indosat, it seems like the simplest reason would be to ensure that data putatively obtained from the IETF would in fact be obtained from the IETF.

From my perspective, I would support a statement to the effect that IETF technology should be obtainable using https or whatever else we are recommending as "secure.” I’d also be in favor of asking IETF contributors to obtain and use PGP keys and/or DKIM encodings to sign messages. And of asking that IETF tools not reformat email in ways that corrupt data that has been signed.

To that end, I could imagine a requirement for some kind of roadmap. “The tools that access the IETF SMTP and HTTP sites use protocols X, Y, and Z. After <date>, we require them to use Secure X, Secure Y, and Secure Z, and traffic originated by the IETF sites shall use such protocols."

On Apr 3, 2014, at 4:24 PM, Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com> wrote:

> My reaction is also to ask "Why?"  Security and privacy involve trade-offs where various costs (including operational difficulty) are weighed against the benefits, such as protecting information from unauthorized disclosure or modification.  So, I'd suggest that a blanket statement isn't a good idea, but rather, a service-by-service decision should be made.  For example, XMPP and document submission may justify requiring encryption while email and document retrieval might not.
> 
> -- 
> Randall Gellens
> Opinions are personal;    facts are suspect;    I speak for myself only
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