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Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Thu, 04 June 2020 21:28 UTC

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Subject: Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Craig Partridge <craig@tereschau.net>
Cc: IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>
References: <CAHQj4Cf_vgXYEL=x4DCEnpwNxZpJQSD-h6MWmhMWpYwPF9XFow@mail.gmail.com> <E23EC459-213F-4D19-BC1B-6050EC2CB653@strayalpha.com> <CAHQj4CcOpciujCP9ugegjEjzyT7Oqzv_WtjWyTAGacUxkG9YYg@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRjMQtcYDF04-3FsN1WOg_7H1fpR2_qPUwa-BegkQqp8A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 09:28:23 +1200
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Richard,

> On the UDP side, there should be no issue.  Anything above UDP has to tolerate loss anyway, so there should be mechanisms that will require from corruption-treated-as-loss. 

That depends. If a single bit inversion can get through undetected, the application layer might never detect an anomalx. (See what I did there?)

Regards
   Brian Carpenter

On 05-Jun-20 09:18, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Yeah, secure transports already consider the data from the network untrusted, including TLS and DTLS, but also IPsec/ESP, SSH, SRTP and QUIC.  As long as those protocols are using reasonably modern, AEAD ciphers, the worst impact of corruption in the transport is DoS.
> 
> That said, there might be some pretty hard crashes in cases where the security protocol relies on the transport for something..  For example, TLS doesn't have a mechanism for requesting that data be re-sent in the event of loss/corruption, because it's assumed that TCP provides that.  If corruption is only detected at the TLS layer, there's not a way to recover.  That said, I wouldn't be surprised if many TLS stacks close the connection on bad data anyway.
> 
> On the UDP side, there should be no issue.  Anything above UDP has to tolerate loss anyway, so there should be mechanisms that will require from corruption-treated-as-loss.
> 
> So there may be some feedback loops to close, but that's a more limited, host-internal problem.
> 
> In any case -- one more reason to encrypt everything!
> 
> --Richard
> 
> On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 4:17 PM Craig Partridge <craig@tereschau.net <mailto:craig@tereschau.net>> wrote:
> 
>     Ah, I somehow had missed that.
> 
>     Looks like it does the trick if we need it. Not sure if we'd have to update the optional checksum to use a new checksum too.
> 
>     Craig
> 
>     On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 1:33 PM Joe Touch <touch@strayalpha.com <mailto:touch@strayalpha..com>> wrote:
> 
>         See draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options
> 
>         > On Jun 4, 2020, at 12:13 PM, Craig Partridge <craig@tereschau.net <mailto:craig@tereschau.net>> wrote:
>         >
>         > Then there's UDP.  UDP has no options.
> 
> 
> 
>     -- 
>     *****
>     Craig Partridge's email account for professional society activities and mailing lists.
>

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