Secdir Review of draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Mon, 09 March 2015 12:10 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: ietf@ietf.org,secdir@ietf.org,iesg@ietf.org
Subject: Secdir Review of draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 08:10:24 -0400
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This is an update to netconf over TLS with mutual X.509 authentication.

In general, this looks fairly good.

I'd ask the security ADs to take a look at two things:

* The text on certificate validation in section 5.
Certificate validation has a number of options, none of which are
described or specified in this text.
Is that good enough for this application?  (Probably)

In section 7, there is a description of how the netconf server finds the
username of the client.
It talks about a certificate fingerprint without a reference to a
specific algorithm.
I'm aware of multiple algorithms for fingerprints.
This text is probably too vague for interoperability.